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Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory: An Evolutionary Perspective 
One characteristic of humans is that they have a sense of self. Exactly what does 
this mean? Examination of research and theory exploring the psychology of the self 
suggests that it has at least three important aspects. 
  The first of these aspects is representation: The memory system contains mental 
structures that store and organize different kinds of self-relevant knowledge. Some of this 
knowledge is affective, reflecting the feelings that people have about themselves. Also, 
some of the knowledge is behavioral, reflecting mental procedures that contain memories 
of how to carry out various routines (e.g., riding a bicycle). This procedural information 
is often stored in non-verbal form. In addition, some of the knowledge reflects episodic 
memories of specific life events. These memories contain perceptual details of events, as 
well as information about event contexts (e.g., the time at which an event occurred). 
Furthermore, some of the knowledge is semantic, reflecting memories of self-judgments 
or the judgments that others have made of, and conveyed to, the self. These self-
judgments can be global (e.g., I am an uncoordinated person) or situationally constrained 
(e.g., I am good at cooking Indian food). These semantic representations can also contain 
memories of meta-cognitions (e.g., ideas about how others perceive one’s behavior), 
information referring to dyadic relationships, information about one’s position within a 
group, and information about intragroup dynamics and intergroup relations. Moreover, 
these semantic representations might contain information about how one compares to 
others or to the groups to which one belongs. Such information highlights those attributes 
that make one unique and distinct from attributes that characterize others (personal self), Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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those attributes that are shared with others with whom one has interpersonal relations 
(relational self), or those attributes that one shares with the groups to which one belongs 
(collective self ) (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). 
  The second attribute of the human self is that it maintains an executive function, 
regulating an individual’s relation with the social and physical environment. Three 
classes of motives likely guide this capacity (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000; Sedikides, 
Skowronski, & Gaertner, 2004): valuation (i.e., protecting and enhancing the self), 
learning (i.e., pursing a relatively accurate image of the self, improving skills and 
abilities), and homeostasis (i.e., seeking and endorsing information that is consistent with 
the self). 
  The third attribute of the self is reflexivity. This term can be defined as the 
organism’s ability to depict itself in its ongoing relation with other objects. Reflexivity is 
manifested in the interplay between the representational and executive capacities. For 
example, reflexivity allows the organism to alter long-term goals and render them 
congruent with anticipated environmental changes. This ability to reflect on the self also 
involves the capacity for humans to engage in mental time travel. That is, humans can 
remember (or, more accurately, use their knowledge to reconstruct) specific events in the 
past, and can have some knowledge of the time and the place at which those events 
occurred. Humans can also reflect on their role in future events and engage in alternative 
mental simulations of future events in which the nature of those events, an individual’s 
role in those events, and each event’s outcome can be manipulated.  
  In previous writings (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997, 2000, 2003; Sedikides, Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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Skowronski, & Dunbar, in press; Sedikides et al. 2004; Skowronski & Sedikides, 1999), 
we discussed these aspects of the self in the context of evolution. Our argument has been 
that these self-aspects developed in response to the environmental challenges that were 
encountered by the ancestors of the human species and by early humans. These 
environmental challenges included not only the pressures imposed by the physical 
environment (e.g., food procurement, climate, predation), but also the pressures imposed 
by the social and cultural context of human behavior.  
Temporal Knowledge in the Context of Evolution 
  The present chapter will recapitulate some of these themes in the context of the 
ability of humans to remember events in their lives at specific points in time. We do so 
with some trepidation, for the study of time and memory has a long intellectual history. 
For example, in his Confessiones, penned early in the fourth century, Saint Augustine 
(Book XI, see Haddan’s 1872 translation) derived the then-radical conclusion that 
perceptions of time itself (or, at least, perceptions of the past and of the future) are things 
that are contained in the mind. Augustine was largely concerned with the estimation of 
durations; the length of time events happened or the length of time between events. This 
interest in event durations significantly influenced early scientific psychological 
theorizing (James, 1890) and is reflected in the modern discipline of mental 
chronobiology (Bradshaw & Szabadi, 1997). 
  However, the ability to make these duration judgments presupposes the ability to 
know how long ago the beginning of an event (or when a prior event) occurred. Thus, in 
order to understand duration estimates, psychologists need to know how an individual Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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knows the age of events. Whereas event-specific temporal knowledge has not been 
studied as thoroughly as duration perceptions, it too has a long intellectual history 
(Hoffding, 1885; James, 1890; Sturt, 1925) and has recently been the subject of intense 
empirical scrutiny (Friedman, 2004; Hoerl & McCormack, 2001). 
  Why might the ability to know the time at which an event occurred, or the event’s 
age, be important to humans? One reason lies in the fact that humans have a self-concept, 
and many elements of this self-concept incorporate, or require the use of, at least some 
event-specific temporal knowledge. For example, an individual’s sense of growth and 
change comes from their ability to know when events occurred in their lives. How can 
one draw any conclusions about progress in one’s ability in a given domain if one cannot 
properly order recollections of the early episodes of struggle and the later episodes of 
accomplishment? More generally, just imagine how incomplete one’s sense of self might 
be without the ability to temporally locate autobiographical events. Given this line of 
argument, it seems reasonable to argue that, to understand the self, one must understand 
the nature of one’s ability to remember events in their temporal context.  
  The evolutionary twist to this idea is the argument that the capacity to develop a 
self-concept may have been a product of evolution (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997, 
2000, 2003; Sedikides et al., in press). That is, the capacity to think about the self in an 
abstract manner was likely an adaptive response to the environmental pressures faced by 
both the species that were ancestors to modern humans and the early members of the 
human species. The possession of a self-concept can endow the possessor with several 
rewards, ranging from advantages in food procurement, predation avoidance, and Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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interpersonal relations with other group members. We extend this line of reasoning by 
taking an evolutionary perspective on an organism’s ability to remember when an event 
or behavior occurred. We argue that being able to store temporally-relevant information 
and being able to retrieve and use that information to determine the time at which an 
event occurred has adaptive value to a species. 
  What might that adaptive value be? Being sensitive to temporal information can 
improve the fit between an organism and the environmental niche that the organism 
occupies. For example, many organisms have the ability to remember the time of day at 
which given sources of food are available (Gallistel, 1990). Similar kinds of temporal 
sensitivity may guide the instigation of migratory behaviors, as well as times in which an 
individual chooses to be relatively inactive. Such inactivity minimizes energy use at low-
payoff times or helps to protect an organism from predation. In short, in many 
circumstances time is one of the discriminative cues that an organism uses to optimize its 
behavior in a given environment. It matters for an organism to be sensitive to, and use, 
temporal information. 
  One element of this sensitivity to time is the ability to store temporal information 
in, and retrieve it from, memory. This can be accomplished in several ways. One might 
build temporal sensitivity into an organism in such a way that the temporal stimulus is a 
relatively automatic trigger for behavior. One hypothetical example is activity level. For 
some organisms, when light levels fall below a given threshold, the neural system may 
automatically instigate behavior inactivity. A second way in which an organism can be 
sensitive to temporal information is via some sort of conceptual or rule-based knowledge. Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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For example, an individual organism may have developed abstract concepts allowing 
differentiation among different types of flowers, and might come to learn that a given 
type of flower is good to visit when the sun goes down because that is when the flowers 
open and make the flowers’ sweet-tasting nectar available. This does not require memory 
for specific flower visits. It requires only the realization that a given flower type, visited 
at a given time, is likely to yield a food reward. A third way in which an organism can be 
sensitive to temporal information occurs when temporal information is stored as a part of 
memories for specific episodes. For example, an organism might remember that a given 
river contained many fish when the river was visited at a particular time of day and in a 
particular season. Such event-based recollections might induce the organism to visit that 
river again at that same time during that same season.  
  These sources of temporal knowledge correspond to the three different types of 
knowledge (anoetic, noetic, and autonoetic) that can be stored in memory and that may 
comprise different memory subsystems (Tulving, 1985). This distinction, too, is of 
potential evolutionary importance. Some scholars have argued that not all organisms 
share these different knowledge systems, and that some systems are more characteristic 
of organisms that have particularly large and differentiated brains that can perform 
numerous specialized and complex thinking tasks. For example, Suddendorf and 
Corballis (1997) suggest that the ability to remember single specific episodes from one’s 
past is a relatively recent evolutionary development, relying on the ability to think about 
oneself in abstract terms. In their view, the fact that the self has the property of reflexivity 
is what allows humans so easily to think about past behaviors and events that occur at a Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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particular time and in a particular place. The produce of this reflexive thinking can then 
be stored in memory. Hence, in the view of Suddendorf and Corballis, the ability to have 
episodic memories can only occur once an organism has acquired the capacity to think 
about oneself abstractly (e.g., as a symbolic self; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). Their 
thesis, then, is that there can be no memory for individual events without a functional 
self-concept. 
  We disagree with this thesis. Both reason and data suggest to us that the ability to 
represent and use recalled event-specific information (including temporal information) 
evolved independently of the capacity to form and use a symbolic self. Instead, we 
propose that the evolution of a symbolic self depends, in part, on the prior ability to 
mentally represent the details of specific life events. Hence, we would expect to observe 
evidence that the ability to know the time at which events occurred emerged earlier in 
evolution and was a more widespread adaptation compared to the ability to form a 
symbolic self.    
  In evaluating this proposal, one must first consider whether the ability to recall the 
temporal context of specific life episodes itself could be an adaptation driven by 
evolution. Friedman (2001) argues that the ability to remember the temporal context of 
specific episodes may not have much adaptive potential. Instead, he argues that the 
ability to remember information relevant to the typical time cycles that are important to 
an organism’s environmental niche is a more likely candidate for the action of natural 
selection. We disagree. Rather, we maintain that, in many circumstances, it can be very 
adaptive for an organism to have even approximate knowledge of when a past event Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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occurred or when a prior action was performed. 
  Consider, for example, animals who engage in food-caching behavior. Some 
cached foods are relatively impervious to decay (e.g., nuts). Other types of food are 
relatively decay-prone. If an organism is to make efficient use of time in retrieving food 
from multiple caches, then it would be useful if the organism could remember how long 
ago a given food item was cached – especially if the animal has the ability to learn that 
some foods spoil when stored for long periods of time.  
  This is not a hypothetical example. Griffiths, Dickinson, and Clayton (1999; also 
see de Kort, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2005) trained jays in a task in which the jays cached 
either worms or peanuts in two separate sand-filled trays. The birds were given the 
opportunity to learn that the worms decayed and were inedible 124 hours after caching, 
but that the peanuts were still edible. After training, the jays were later presented with a 
task in which one food was cached in one side of a tray and, 120 hours later, the other 
food was cached on the other side of the tray. Four hours later, the jays were allowed to 
forage in the tray. When the worms were the first food cached (124 hours ago), the jays 
preferentially searched for peanuts. This did not occur when the worms were the second 
food cached (four hours ago). Such behavior required that the jays remembered what they 
had hidden, where they had hidden it, and how long ago it was hidden. The jays’ use of 
all of these kinds of information would seem to be hallmarks of memories for specific 
episodes. 
  However, as we will note later in this chapter, the behavior of the jays does not 
necessarily imply that they had specific memories for each of the caching events. Several Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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theorists (Roberts, 2002; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997) have claimed that other, non-
event specific memory information might be responsible for the jays’ ability to remember 
how long ago a food was cached. At the moment, more important for our purposes is the 
idea that memory for an event’s age can sometimes have adaptive value for an organism, 
and hence, is potentially an attribute that can be evolutionarily selected.  
  The ability to locate events in time is not solely restricted to jays. For example, 
Schwartz, Hoffman, and Evans (2005) have conducted studies with King, an adult male 
western lowland gorilla. The results of these studies showed that King’s behavior 
reflected episodic-like memory properties, in that King could remember the order of past 
events (Experiment 1) and could remember where events occurred (Experiment 2).  
  In our view, the generality of such findings across species is an important fact 
favoring an evolutionary genesis of the ability to locate events in time. In fact, we would 
be quite surprised if this ability were solely the purview of humans. It has often been said 
that evolution is a tinkerer, and works by taking old characteristics and modifying them. 
Hence, it seems sensible that one would find the precursors of temporal knowledge 
abilities, or simple versions of a temporal knowledge system, in those species that are 
relatively close to humans on the bush of evolution. Moreover, because nature often re-
uses solutions, when species confront similar environmental pressures, evolution often 
comes up with similar responses to those pressures. Hence, even species that are distantly 
related may come to share similar traits because of the extent to which those traits aid 
adaptiveness to the similar environments shared by those species. This suggests that, if Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
 
 
 
 
11 
the ability to remember temporal knowledge is an adaptation, then it may be shared by 
many species that inhabit similar environments.   
  Obviously, the adaptive value of temporal knowledge will be particularly high for 
species whose environments continually present problems that can be best solved if one 
has access to the temporal context of past events and behaviors. Humans are one of these 
species. For example, a crucial motive that drives human behavior is self-enhancement 
(Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). One of the hallmarks of self-
enhancement is the perception of personal growth – that one has improved one’s status or 
abilities from where one was in the past. Development and maintenance of veridicality in 
such self-judgments relies on the ability to remember what one was like at various points 
in the past. We do not claim that humans are perfect in this regard – peoples’ 
recollections of what they were like at various points in the past can be biased in many 
ways (Cameron, Wilson, & Ross, 2004). Instead, our main point is that pursuit of self-
enhancement is promoted by the ability to perceive improvement from one’s prior state. 
In order to do that, one will need to have at least an approximate sense of the point in 
time at which that prior state existed.  
  The ability to remember the temporal context of events may be particularly 
critical to knowledge in the social domain. In previous work (Sedikides & Skowronski, 
1997, 2003), we have argued that the line of evolution that yielded modern humans was 
likely to have occurred in a relatively unstructured social context. This unstructured 
social context resembles modern human behavior, in which alliances form, shift, 
disengage, and reform with a relatively high frequency. Optimal functioning in such an Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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environment would seem to be facilitated if organisms were able to keep track of who 
had done what with whom (or to whom) at different specific times in the past. Such 
knowledge would likely help individuals to make better decisions about interpersonal 
behavior. For example, if you recall that one group member was a cheater (e.g., hoarded 
provisions) in his early days, but has not engaged in such behavior recently, you might be 
more likely to trust that individual than when you could not remember the times at which 
that individual had cheated or had been honest. 
  Another example might concern decisions about paternity in a species (e.g., 
humans) that does not maintain exclusivity in sexual partners. For example, if a female 
had sex with one individual 15 months ago, with a second individual 8 months ago, and 
with a third individual 2 months ago, the female needs to recall the age of those 
encounters reliably to infer the paternity of the infant to whom she just gave birth. 
Evolution-driven paternity concerns are paramount for females who invest large amounts 
of time and effort in their young (Sagarin, 2005). Hence, it would seem beneficial if the 
new mother could accurately recall the time at which intercourse with each partner was 
initiated so that paternity could be definitively established. 
On Humans’ Ability to Remember When 
  Up to this point in the chapter, we have discussed humans’ ability to place 
personal life events in time in an abstract manner. However, we believe that it would be 
beneficial if some time were spent reviewing a few specific findings pertaining to this 
ability. These findings can be particularly enlightening with respect to the kinds of 
information that are used when individuals attempt to place events in time, and can help Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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clarify some important questions with respect to the possible evolution of the capacity to 
store and retrieve temporal knowledge. 
  Results of a good deal of temporal judgment research suggest that temporal 
knowledge becomes less accurate with increases in time from the target event. For 
example, in several studies conducted in the laboratory of one of this chapter’s co-authors 
(Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, & Larsen, 1995; Thompson, Skowronski, & Lee, 1988a), 
participants entered events in a dated diary, then later attempted to reproduce the date 
when cued with each event (Thompson, Skowronski, Larsen, & Betz, 1996). Participants 
could report an autobiographical event’s exact date often (70% of the time) if an event 
was a week old. However, by the time an autobiographical event was ten weeks old, the 
exact accuracy rate of event dating dropped substantially (e.g., 20% accuracy rate). 
Another way to depict increasing inaccuracy across time is to calculate the extent to 
which the average amount of error associated with event date estimates increases over 
time. In studies reported by Thompson et al. (1996), that amount was approximately one 
day per week of event age. That is, estimates of event dates that were ten weeks old 
evinced an approximate average of 10 days of error; events that were 20 weeks old 
evinced an approximate average of 20 days or error, etc. 
  A second consistent pattern, also illustrated by the abovementioned findings, is 
that participants do not often recall the exact time at which an event occurred. In the 
Thompson et al. (1996) investigation, even when events were only 10 weeks old, and 
even when participants had the advantage of writing the events in a dated diary, 
participants could still date only one in five events with exact accuracy. Friedman (1987) Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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reported that this paucity of event-specific temporal memory was evidenced across 
multiple time frames: Participants in his study infrequently reported exact temporal 
knowledge about events, regardless of whether one asked about the month in which an 
event occurred, the day of the month, the day of the week, or the hour of the day. 
  The accumulating data also suggest a relationship between memory for an event’s 
content and the accuracy of event dating: The better an event is remembered, the more 
accurate the temporal estimate provided for the event. For example, in several studies 
(Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, & Shannon, 1991; Betz & Skowronski, 1997), 
participants provided ratings of how well they remembered autobiographical events, as 
well as providing event dates. Self-rated memory strength was significantly related to the 
accuracy of the temporal estimates that were provided by participants. That this should 
occur is obvious – if one recalls that an event occurred when snow was on the ground, 
one would probably suspect that the event occurred in winter. Participants’ self-reports of 
the process by which they obtained event dates fit with this notion. They indicated that 
they did sometimes use their ability to remember event details to reconstruct the time at 
which an event occurred.  
  The notion that event dates are reconstructed leaves open the possibility that those 
reconstructions can be biased. Indeed, many such biases have been identified. These 
biases often reflect the influence of abstract real-world knowledge on temporal 
judgments. For example, one bias occurs due to the presence of a bounded time period 
specifying the starting and ending points between which events must have occurred. 
Many of the studies conducted in this line of research used such bounded periods – Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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typically the beginning and end of academic terms. The presence of such boundaries 
produced telescoping effects in the date estimates (Thompson, Skowronski, & Lee, 
1988b). When the events were recent, the events were misdated in the direction of being 
older than they were (backward telescoping); when the events were old, the events were 
misdated in the direction of being younger then they were (forward telescoping). The 
telescoping effects reflect the impact of landmark boundaries on those guesses: Dating 
errors drift toward the middle of the period defined by the boundaries (Rubin & 
Baddeley, 1989). 
  Errors in dating observed by Thompson, Skowronski, and Betz (1993) provided 
additional evidence for the use of landmarks to construct date estimates. One typical 
landmark event is the start of a connected event sequence, such as the start of a vacation. 
To estimate the dates of all the same-vacation events listed in one’s diary, one simply has 
to establish the date of the initial event and subsequently date all the vacation events 
relative to that initially dated landmark. However, if the first event is misdated, then the 
remaining events would be misdated by exactly the same amount of time. Thompson et 
al. (1993) showed that there were frequent “error runs” in the date estimates: Clusters of 
similarly-misdated events (e.g., a series of events on 5 consecutive days, all of which 
were misdated by 7 days) occurred at a rate greater than that expected by chance.  
  One other consistently observed finding is that, when temporal information is 
reconstructed, the reconstructions often use available information that can operate on 
relatively independent multiple time scales. For example, Skowronski et al. (1991) first 
showed that error frequencies in date estimates showed a peculiar “scalloping” pattern: Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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The most frequent errors in date estimates were at multiples of seven days (7, 14, 21, 
etc.). Such error patterns reflect the fact that a standard blank calendar that included day 
of the week was used to cue participants’ date estimates (Gibbons & Thompson, 2001), 
and that participants had day-of the week knowledge available to them that was cued by 
these day-of-week labels. Hence, the calendar might prompt people to recall that an event 
happened on a Tuesday, but not which Tuesday.  
  Betz and Skowronski (1997) elaborated on this finding. They showed that 
participants were more likely to make dating errors within particular day-of-week 
segments than between day-of-week segments. For example, it was relatively likely that a 
person would misdate a Saturday event (e.g., attending a nephew’s soccer match) as 
occurring on a Sunday; but it was relatively less likely that the person would misdate that 
event as occurring on a Tuesday. They argued that these findings followed from top-
down knowledge about the nature of events that occur within a given week. That is, for 
many people, weeks are temporally segmented into subunits: a typical segmentation is 
weekend versus weekday. Hence, when trying to reconstruct the date in which an event 
occurred, people may be able to place it in a week subsegment (e.g., a weekend event), 
but not the exact day within that subsegment. Thus, misdating errors are likely to occur 
for days within a given subsegment, but not between subsegments.   
  Many of the findings described in the preceding paragraphs point to the notion 
that substantial reconstruction is needed to establish the time at which an event occurred. 
The effortful nature of such reconstructions seemed to be confirmed by the subjective 
responses of participants in the Thompson–Skowronski event dating studies. The process Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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of determining event dates was subjectively difficult for many of these individuals (e.g., 
they often complained about the difficulty of the task), and it typically took participants a 
long time to complete the dating task. 
  However, not all temporal knowledge needs to be so painstakingly reconstructed. 
For example, some studies exploring temporal knowledge ask participants to judge the 
order in which two events occurred. Response accuracy and latency are commonly 
recorded in such studies (Skowronski, Walker, & Betz, 2003; Skowronski, Ritchie, 
Walker, Betz, Sedikides, Bethencourt et al., 2006). One outcome of such studies is a 
temporal distance effect: Controlling for the ages of the events that are involved, the 
farther apart in age the two events are, the easier (faster, more accurate) the judgment 
becomes. This temporal distance effect is inconsistent with the notion that event age 
estimates are obtained with great difficulty. Instead, for events that are far apart in age, 
event order judgments are made with great speed and accuracy. This suggests that there is 
some characteristic of event representations that allows rapid identification of 
rudimentary forms of temporal knowledge. 
  In fact, when viewed through a different lens, many of the studies in the 
Thompson-Skowronski program of research can also be viewed as supportive of such 
mechanisms. For example, even though the error magnitudes associated with event date 
estimates increased substantially with an event’s age, it was nonetheless the case that the 
average of the date estimates across participants often approximated an event’s real age. 
Thus, though erroneous, the event dates were not random guesses – participants’ 
responses often reflected some temporal knowledge. This rough level of accuracy Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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emerged even when participants indicated that the event date that they provided was not a 
product of reconstruction, but was it was just a guess.  
  On the basis of his research with children, Friedman (2001) came to a similar 
conclusion about the fact that some temporal knowledge may not come from elaborate 
temporal reconstructions. He reviewed the results of several studies suggesting that 
young children have the ability to know approximate event ages (at least up to a point), 
despite being unable to engage in relatively sophisticated temporal reconstructive 
strategies. 
  Possible sources of rough information about an event’s age come from the 
characteristics of a memory: its accessibility or its vividness, for example. The stronger 
the memory, or the more easily it comes to mind, the more recent the event. In fact, 
although not voluminous, the literature already provides some evidence for the operation 
of such mechanisms (Bradburn, Rips, & Shevell, 1987). 
  A second possibility is that autobiographical events are linked to semantic 
information that has temporal implications (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). That is, 
there may be a “header” or “tag” linked to an event that identifies the broad period in 
which the event occurred. This tag could be “graduate school” or “my first job” or “when 
I was a kid.”  When events are separated by long periods of time, temporal 
discriminations may be easy because the temporal orderings are specified by the tags 
(“when I was a kid” comes before “graduate school”). When events are relatively close in 
time, such time-discriminating event tags may not be present and people may need 
repeatedly to access fine-grained event knowledge in their attempt to determine event Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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orders. Such repeated access is difficult, which would be indicated by responses that take 
a long time and are often incorrect. Recent research (Skowronski et al., 2006) has 
confirmed this prediction.   
  Another possibility lies in the fact that the self-concept can serve as a context for 
memory (Skowronski, Walker, & Edlund, 2006). When recalling an autobiographical 
event, one’s recollection might include memories about self – both external 
characteristics and abilities as well as internal states and traits. For example, when 
reminded about scoring a game-winning goal, one might bring to mind that she or he was 
insecure because or a recent move to a new town, was small in physical stature in 
comparison to other players on the team, and had just mastered a new bicycle kick that 
allowed the goal to be scored. This activated self-image can serve as a “rough and ready” 
cue that helps to place an event in temporal context. Thus, one might be able roughly to 
place an event in time by comparing the self-image activated by event recall to one’s 
current self-image. Self-images that are highly discrepant imply old events; self-images 
that are congruent imply recent events. Similarly, when trying to decide which of two 
events is more recent, the event that prompts recall of a self-image that is more discrepant 
from the current self is the event that will be judged to be older. 
  One final possibility is that some form of temporal information is encoded when 
events are stored in memory. For example, Brown, Preece, and Hulme (2000) suggest the 
presence of an array of neural-array oscillators that work at different frequencies. The 
state of the array at any given moment is a learning context that can become a part of the 
stored memory for a given experience. Generally speaking, the greater the temporal Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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distance between two events, the greater the difference in the values output by the 
oscillator array. Hence, one should theoretically be able to determine how long ago 
events occurred by examining the state of the oscillator information that was encoded 
with a given memory and comparing it to the current oscillator state. Likewise, the 
oscillator states of two retrieved memories could be used to determine the relative 
recency of two recalled events. Such knowledge need not be explicitly accessed, but can 
instead be an implicit part of the memory system (Brown & Chater, 2001). Hence, when 
this mechanism is operative people may simply “know” the relative times of events 
without the need for extensive reconstruction. 
  These oscillator models of temporal knowledge have several advantages. One is 
that they can be mathematically modelled, as Brown et al. (2000) have done for their 
OSCAR model. A second advantage is that, because such models do not involve the 
operation of higher-order cognitive processes, they can also be applied to the data derived 
from non-humans. Indeed, as noted earlier in this chapter, a large corpus of knowledge 
suggests that animals are sensitive to time and often behave as though they had access to 
event-specific temporal knowledge associated with specific event memories. For 
example, after being fed at different locations at different times of day, pigeons learn to 
anticipate where they will get fed (Saksida & Wilke, 1994). Also, animals can make 
recency judgments between two events: To obtain a reward in a conditional 
discrimination task, animals can respond to a stimulus array by choosing the stimulus that 
was presented most recently (Zentall, 2005). Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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  However, the application of the Brown et al. (2000) oscillator model mechanisms 
to animal temporal judgments would seem to assume that animals possess an episodic 
memory (see McCormack, 2001, p. 292 for a similar argument). Whether or not non-
human animals possess this type of memory system has been the subject of much recent 
debate. The nature of various memory systems, their potential contributions to temporal 
knowledge, and the potential existence of these memory systems across species are topics 
that are treated in the next section. 
The Types of Memory That Contribute to Knowledge of an Event’s Age 
  Obviously, attempts at establishing the time at which an event occurred require 
that an individual have some form of memory. But what kind of memory? We mentioned 
previously the distinction among three levels of knowing: anoetic (non-knowing), noetic 
(knowing) and autonoetic (self-knowing) (Tulving, 1985). Anoetic knowledge reflects 
the traces of experience that are unknowable to the knower. Psychology abounds with 
demonstrations of this kind of knowledge. For example, studies of subliminal priming 
show that individuals’ responses to the world around them can be influenced by stimuli 
presented outside the level of conscious awareness (Stapel & Koomen, 2005). In 
comparison, noetic knowledge reflects one’s knowledge about the world. For example, 
people know that babies are small in size and that dogs are often kept as pets. Finally, 
autonoetic knowledge reflects memory for one’s own personal experiences, such as the 
time one of this chapter’s co-authors was stuck in the airport in Rome. 
  The empirical evidence indicates that these three types of knowledge reflect 
different memory systems with different neural substrates (Buckner & Schacter, 2004). Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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Some of the more exotic findings involve patients with various forms of amnesia. These 
often take the form of dissociations in which only one of the three memory systems 
seems to show impairment. The distinction between anoetic knowledge and the other two 
forms of knowledge is indicated by the fact that some patients, such as the famous H.M., 
lost the ability to remember past experiences but were clearly influenced by those 
experiences (Ogden & Corkin, 1991). Other patients show seeming dissociations in their 
ability to remember information about the world in general and in their ability to recall 
specific events. For example, semantic dementia is primarily a disease in which semantic 
memory is compromised (Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992). Patients who 
show evidence of this dementia have adequate memory for personal events, but are 
unable to name previously familiar objects, people, and places. They show poor language 
comprehension and experience deficits on verbally-based semantic memory tests such as 
category fluency and picture naming, as well as on non-verbal tests of semantic memory. 
The opposite can also occur: Individuals may show evidence of impaired memory for 
personal episodes while retaining much of their general knowledge about the world 
(Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Wheeler & McMillan, 2001). 
The existence of these distinct memory systems implies to some that they have 
evolved via mechanisms of evolution. This argument is plausible. Each of the memory 
systems captures a different type of information, and retention of each type of 
information appears to be beneficial to a species. 
In humans, these memory systems seem to emerge in at different times in an 
infant’s development. Research on infants’ early ability to make sensory discriminations Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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suggests that anoetic forms of memory emerge early in individual human development 
(DeCasper & Fifer, 1980). Similarly, conceptual knowledge in infants emerges quite 
early in individual development (Mandler, 2003).  
In comparison, it is currently believed that the capacity for episodic memory does 
not emerge until the beginning of second year of life, at the earliest (Knopf, Mack, & 
Kressley-Mba, 2005). The phenomenon of childhood amnesia, in which individuals fail 
to recall events in their early childhood (Loftus, 1993), is also seen by many as evidence 
for the late emergence of autonoetic memory. According to Perner and Ruffman (1995), 
this amnesia is caused by children’s inability to represent the experiential origins of one’s 
knowledge. That is, children only gradually attain the mental ability to represent events 
as things that actually happened to them (as opposed to things that are known). 
According to Howe and Courage (1993), the construction of such representations can 
occur only when one has developed a personal identity.  
Due to the notion that episodic memory contains specific information about the 
time and place at which events and behaviors occurred, one might be tempted to link the 
ability to place events in time exclusively to this memory system. We maintain, however, 
that this inference would be a mistake. Instead, each of the memory systems can make a 
contribution to the extent to which an individual knows when an event occurred. 
Consider how general (noetic) knowledge might aid temporal estimation. Even though an 
adult individual may not be able to recall specifically the time when she fell out of her 
high chair, she might reasonably make an inference that the event is old. This can occur 
because of the general knowledge that babies sit in high chairs. Individuals may use Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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anoetic knowledge in their quest for information, as well. They are likely unaware that 
they sometimes use the strength or vividness of their memory to judge the age of an 
event, but they seem to do it, nonetheless (Bradburn et al., 1987). 
 To the extent that the ideas underlying the use of these techniques are valid 
predictors of an event’s age, they can help place events in time. However, they are not 
infallible. Adults may sometimes sit in high chairs, as when being part of a theatrical 
performance. The strength or vividness of memories can vary for reasons other than an 
event’s age; one such reason is poorly encoded events. 
Such reasoning might suggest that a high level of accuracy in temporal knowledge 
requires autonoetic knowledge. For example, one of this chapter’s co-authors vividly 
remembers skiing in the Rocky Mountains. When remembering the event, he has visual 
images of the ski slopes, re-experiences the feeling of a brisk wind in the face, and re-
experiences feeling the cold of the snow when a tumble was taken (and when a crown fell 
off a tooth). These sensations are clues as to when the event occurred: sometime in 
winter. Moreover, in an attempt to narrow down the range of winters in which the event 
occurred, the co-author can recall his companions, the purpose of the trip, and how he felt 
after skiing. This implies that there ought to be a relation between how well one recalls 
an event and the accuracy with which one can place the event in time – a relation that we 
have already noted has been oft-supported in the literature.  
This line of thought can be extended from the level of the individual to the level 
of the species. If individuals who possess an autonoetic memory system (containing 
episodic memories) are better at placing events in time than those who do not possess Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
 
 
 
 
25 
such memories, then those species that possess autonoetic memory systems ought to be 
better at placing events in time than those that do not. Do any species possess autonoetic 
memory systems? Which ones? Can these species use these systems to locate specific 
events in time? 
These questions are currently provoking a fair amount of debate. Some theorists 
(Roberts, 2002; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997) have claimed that only humans possess 
an autonoetic memory system. As evidence for this claim, they note that there is not solid 
and unequivocal evidence pointing to the idea that non-human species can recall 
individual and specific events. However, others look at this claim with some skepticism 
(Eichenbaum, Fortin, Ergorul, Wright, & Agster, K.L., 2005; Olton, 1984; Zentall, 2005), 
pointing out that animals often respond as if they had memories for specific events in 
their lives. 
Supporters of the thesis that only humans possess episodic memories would 
correctly counter by pointing out that temporally sensitive behavior does not necessarily 
require the presence of an episodic memory system. For example, the behavior of the jays 
in the Griffiths et al. (1999) research can be explained by a trace-strength mechanism. 
The jays may have learned that a weak memory trace of meal worm locations implied 
decayed worms, but a stronger memory trace of meal worm locations implied non-
decayed worms. Similar non-episodic mechanisms can be applied to explain the temporal 
discrimination ability of non-human animals. Such explanations are especially attractive 
to some because they rely on anoetic knowledge. That is, they can explain the use of prior Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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knowledge without the necessity of resorting to higher-order conceptual knowledge 
(noetic) or episodic knowledge (autonoetic).   
  However, several recent behavioral experiments suggest the presence of 
autonoetic knowledge in non-human animals. For example, Mercado, Murray, Uyeyama, 
Pack, and Herman (1998) trained dolphins to perform a number of complex responses 
when given arm-gesture commands. Among the commands was one that indicated that 
the dolphin was to repeat the most recent response. Another command was for the 
dolphin to execute a novel response (i.e., not something recently done). On probe trials, 
the dolphins were signaled to execute a novel response, then to repeat the most recent 
response. To respond correctly, the dolphin must have used its memory for its own prior 
behavior for the subsequent response – that is, the dolphin must have had the capacity to 
recall the specific episode encompassed by the initial novel response.  
  Ultimately, the debate about whether animals have autonoetic knowledge may not 
be settled by behavioral evidence alone. Neurological analyses are especially relevant to 
the debate’s outcome. Along these lines, Rolls, Xiang, and Franco, (2005) made 
recordings from single hippocampal formation neurons while macaques performed an 
object-place memory task. This task required the monkeys to learn associations between 
objects and where they were shown in a room. The recordings revealed that some 
neurons responded differently to different objects independently of location; other 
neurons responded to the spatial view independently of which object was present at the 
location; while still other neurons responded to a combination of a particular object and 
the place where it was shown in the room. These results suggest that, in the primate Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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hippocampus, there are separate as well as combined representations of objects and their 
locations in space. Rolls et al. argue that such results are consistent with the presence of 
an episodic memory system, in which the formation of associations between objects and 
the places where they are seen is required. 
  Another study looking at whether episodic memory is neurologically plausible in 
animals similarly implicated the hippocampus in episodic memory. Ergorul and 
Eichenbaum (2004) trained rats to remember single training episodes. Each episode 
consisted of a series of odors presented in different places on an open field. The test task 
examined whether the rats could recall the order of the presented events. The researchers 
examined the individual contributions of odor and spatial cues to the rats’ order 
judgments. Normal rats used a combination of spatial (“where”) and olfactory (“what”) 
cues to distinguish when events occurred. Moreover, rats with lesions of the hippocampus 
failed to using combinations of spatial and olfactory cues in these judgments. These data 
suggest that rats integrate “what,” “where,” and “when” information in memory for single 
experiences, and that the hippocampus is critical to this capacity. 
While acknowledging that the debate about episodic memory in non-humans is 
not yet resolved, we admit favoring a hypothesis that is grounded in principles of 
evolution. As noted earlier, we think that it could be advantageous to a species to have at 
least some memory for specific life episodes. Hence, given the presence of appropriate 
genetic material and selection pressures, it strikes us as plausible that such a memory 
system could have developed in non-humans. Nonetheless, given that the self-concept is 
much more evolved in humans than in non-humans, and that the evolutionary pressures Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
 
 
 
 
28 
of human environments may favor those who possess temporal knowledge, it also strikes 
us as reasonable that the human episodic memory system should be more advanced than 
any similar systems that evolved in non-human animals. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we argued that the capacity to retain temporal knowledge about 
specific events in an individual’s life was a trait subjected to the pressures of evolution. 
Those pressures may have been: (1) environmental, resulting from the need to respond 
adaptively to the need for optimally regulating activities such as food procurement; (2) 
social, resulting from the need to establish interpersonal facts, such as infant paternity; 
and (3) internal, resulting from the needs and requirements of a mental system capable of 
symbolically representing and manipulating information about the self. 
We supported this argument by pointing out that the capacity to possess event-
specific temporal knowledge was not unique to humans, and that some of the same 
mental mechanisms available for the establishment of temporal knowledge in humans are 
also available to non-human species. In addition, however, we noted that existing 
evidence suggests that the capacity to represent and use temporal knowledge is better 
evolved in humans than in other species. A case in point is the presence of an autonoetic 
memory system, giving humans especially good access to event-related information that 
could aid in establishing the time at which an event occurred. A review of the human 
literature pointed to the use of this information in the reconstruction of temporal 
knowledge, as well as to the operation of other mental mechanisms involving both 
anoetic and noetic forms of information.  Temporal Knowledge and Autobiographical Memory  --- 
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